This paper studies the conduct of macroprudential policies in a monetary union with heterogeneous members, both from a positive and a normative perspective. I develop a two-country new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints to explore this issue. I consider three types of cross-country heterogeneity: asymmetric shocks, di¤erent proportion of borrowers, and mortgage contract heterogeneity. As a macroprudential tool, I propose a Taylor-type rule for the loan-to-value ratio which responds to deviations in output and house prices. This policy can be implemented at a national or union level. Results show that the welfare-maximizing rule responds relatively more aggressively to house prices, especially in the case of the mortgage contract asymmetry.
However, depending on the source of heterogeneity, the rule should be implemented at a national or a union level
© 2001-2024 Fundación Dialnet · Todos los derechos reservados