The social cost of non-compliance and the optimal punishment of corruption. Can European policy measures be helpful?

• Autores: Bruno Bosco, Margherita Savona
• Localización: XXI Encuentro Economía Pública, 2014, pág. 83
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper corruption is analysed in a model in which private compliance costs are explicitly introduced as well as asymmetry of information between government and private agents in a Principal�Agent model of costly regulation. Conditions leading to efficient anti corruption measures are derived and compared with those obtained by previous literature. An explicit analysis of the efficiency cost of corruption is also presented. European legislation is examined and evaluated according to the model�s results. The potential effects of European norms are discussed in the perspective that corruption is a great obstacle to an efficient management of the public sector that negatively affects the role of institutions in each country