Self-determination, self-transformation, and the case of Jean Valjean: : a problem for Velleman

• Autores: Christopher Evan Franklin
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 10, 2015, págs. 2591-2598
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events (such as desires and beliefs) involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry (which I call ‘identification reductionism’) contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper I discuss J. David Velleman’s identification reductionist theory, according to which an agent is identified with his desire to make most sense of himself. I develop two constraints that an adequate identification reductionist theory must satisfy and show that Velleman’s theory cannot satisfy both. In particular, I argue that Velleman’s account founders on cases of self-determined self-transformation