Moral judgment as a natural kind

• Autores: Victor Kumar
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 11, 2015, págs. 2887-2910
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this essay I argue that moral judgment is a natural kind by developing an empirically grounded theory of the distinctive conceptual content of moral judgments. Psychological research on the moral/conventional distinction suggests that in moral judgments right and wrong, good and bad, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, etc. are conceptualized as (1) serious, (2) general, (3) authority-independent, and (4) objective. After laying out the theory and the empirical evidence that supports it, I address recent empirical and conceptual objections. Finally, I suggest that the theory uniquely accounts for the possibility of genuine moral agreement and disagreement