A normative account of the need for explanation

• Autores: Wai-hung Wong, Zanja Yudell
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 192, Nº. 9, 2015, págs. 2863-2885
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Although explanation is a central topic in the philosophy of science, there is an important issue concerning explanation that has not been discussed much, namely, why some phenomena need an explanation while some do not. In this paper we first explain why this is an important issue, and then discuss two accounts of the need for explanation that can be gathered from the literature. We argue that both accounts are inadequate. The main purpose of the paper is, however, to offer a normative account of the need for explanation. On this account, a demand for explanation is possible only against the background of a certain understanding of the world (call it a ‘map’). It is the map we are using that provides us with the concepts and beliefs in terms of which we can ask for an explanation. And a phenomenon needs explanation only when it does not fit the map—the phenomenon’s not fitting the map is a good reason for us to look for an explanation of it. This account not only captures our pre-theoretical understanding of the need for explanation, but also is in accordance with our practice of demanding an explanation