The Woody Allen puzzle: : How ‘authentic alienation’ complicates autonomy

• Autores: Suzy Killmister
• Localización: Noûs, ISSN-e 1468-0068, Vol. 49, Nº. 4, 2015, págs. 729-747
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Theories of autonomy commonly make reference to some form of endorsement: an action is autonomous insofar as the agent has a second-order desire towards the motivating desire, or takes it to be a reason for action, or is not alienated from it. In this paper I argue that all such theories have difficulty accounting for certain kinds of agents, what I call ‘Woody Allen cases’. In order to make sense of such cases, I suggest, it is necessary to disambiguate two distinct forms of endorsement, both of which contribute to autonomy