Legislated protection and the world trade organization

• Autores: T. Renee Bowen
• Localización: International economic review, ISSN-e 1468-2354, Vol. 56, Nº. 4, 2015, págs. 1349-1384
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Tariff bindings and administered protection are two characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are little understood. Tariff bindings place a ceiling on tariffs that is not always reached, whereas administered protection provides all industries with some minimum import protection, effectively creating a floor for protection. How do these policies affect applied most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates that are enacted through the legislature? I model tariffs determined by a dynamic legislative process and show that low applied MFN tariffs are less likely with tariff bindings and more likely with administered protection than under purely legislated protection