Incumbency Effects under Proportional Representation: Leaders and Backbenchers in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies

• Miriam A. Golden ^[2] ; Lucio Picci ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Bologna

     University of Bologna

     Bolonia, Italia

     
  2. [2] University of California
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 40, N. 4, 2015, págs. 509-538
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We study incumbency effects for individual legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party) in Italy's lower house of representatives over 10 legislatures (1948–92) elected using open-list proportional representation. Our analysis finds no reelection advantage for the average incumbent legislator. Only a tiny elite in each party successfully creates an incumbency advantage. We find incumbents advantaged for reselection by their political party. We interpret reselection advantage as a party loyalty premium. Our study depicts a political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters.