Strategic Challenger Entry in a Federal System: The Role of Economic and Political Conditions in State Legislative Competition

• Steven Rogers ^[1]
  1. [1] Sant Louis University
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 40, N. 4, 2015, págs. 539-570
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Over a third of state legislators do not face challengers when seeking reelection. Existing analyses of state legislative contestation almost exclusively focus on the stable institutional features surrounding elections and ignore conditions that change between elections. I remedy this oversight by investigating how political contexts influence challenger entry. State legislators—particularly members of the governor's party—more often face opposition during weak state economies, but the president's copartisans are even more likely to receive a challenger when the president is unpopular. My findings suggest that both national- and state-level political conditions have an important impact on challengers' entry strategies.