Russell and Humean Inferences

• Monteiro, João Paulo ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade de Lisboa

     Universidade de Lisboa

     Socorro, Portugal

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 5, Nº. 1-2, 2001, págs. 55-72
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Russell's The Problems of Philosophy tries to establish a new theory of induction, at the same time that Hume is there accused of an irrationa/sceptictsm about induction". But a careful analysis of the theory of knowledge explicitly acnowledged by Hume revoais thctt, contrary to the standard interpretation in the XXth century, possibly influenced by Russell, Hume deals exclusively with causal inference (which he never classifies as "causal induction", although now we are entitkd to do so), never with inductive inference in general, mainly generalisations abouy sensible qualities of objects ( whether, e.g., "all crows are black" or not is not arnong Hume's concerns). Russell's the,ories are thus only false alternativesto Hume's, in (1912) or in his (1948).