The foundherentist view of justication by experience

• Ryan, James ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Western Ontario

     University of Western Ontario

     Canadá

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 4, Nº. 1, 2000, págs. 79-88
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • I show that Susan Haack's foundherentisit theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any proposition). Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certam beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true. This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their jusfication from experience, contrary to coherentism.