Epistemic value and fortuitous truth

• Cheyne, Colin ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Otago

     University of Otago

     Nueva Zelanda

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 1, Nº. 1, 1997, págs. 109-134
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise? I argue that the problem lies in that fact that the epistemologists' intuitive concept of knowledge appeals to desiderata that probably cannotbe satisfied. Unfortunately, if we abandon some of these desiderata, it is difficult to settle on a concept of knowledge which is not too remote from our initial intuitions. I suggest that epistemology may be better off without the concept of knowledge. There are plenty of other interesting notions for us to be going on with.