Germany: : The “right to be forgotten” can be asserted vis-à-vis the operator on an online archive

• Autores: Tobias Raab
• Localización: IRIS: Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory, ISSN-e 1023-8565, Nº. 10, 2015, págs. 9-10
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • In a judgment of 7 July 2015, the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Hamburg Court of Appeal) decided that the “right to be forgotten” can also be asserted vis-à-vis the operator on an online archive (Case 7 U 29/12).

    The plaintiff sought injunctive relief against the publisher of a national daily newspaper and operator of its internet site, where, in addition to news items, older reports were made available in an online archive. The reports included the institution, progress and discontinuance of investigation proceedings brought against the plaintiff by the public prosecutor’s office and on third parties’ reactions dating from 2010 and 2011. The subject matter of the proceedings was a criminal complaint brought against the plaintiff alleging he had anonymously faxed insulting and defamatory letters to a politician. After the proceedings had been discontinued against payment of EUR 40,000, the circumstances of the case were criticised and commented on in the daily press. The plaintiff complained that the defendant was continuing to keep the reporting on the circumstances of the case publicly accessible. The undated articles on the defendant’s website could still be found among the top three search results on google.de after 2012 by entering the plaintiff’s name. The plaintiff called for the reporting on the investigation proceedings mentioning either his name or other details revealing his identity to be discontinued. The Landgericht Hamburg (Hamburg District Court) dismissed the complaint in its judgment of 30 March 2012 (Case 324 O 9/12), stating that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief because ordering the defendant to delete or amend the articles that had initially been lawfully disseminated constituted a serious violation of press freedom that was not justified by the infringement of the plaintiff's general personality rights. The reporting was on a subject of considerable public interest at the time of the publication, concerned a mere suspicion and did not portray the plaintiff as a convicted offender