Consistency in the Sartrean analysis of emotion

• Autores: Anthony Hatzimoysis
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 74, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 81-83
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre analyses emotions in terms of their role in conscious agency. What is rarely noted is that Sartre gives a counterexample to his own theory: ‘the immediate reactions of horror and wonder that sometimes possess us when certain objects suddenly appear to us’ is not explained by the theory developed in the main body of the monograph.1 That critical remark is followed by a diagnosis for the apparent failure of the theory to account for those cases, and a proposal as to how they could be accommodated in a phenomenological account of emotions.

    Sartre’s proposal, though, might be found unsatisfactory. Sarah Richmond has claimed that there are two lines of reasoning in the Sketch, which are in clear conflict with each other.2 I will argue that the Sketch is open to a different reading, which avoids attributing an inconsistency to Sartre's theory. Let me first explicate how the …