Bern/Berne/Berna, Suiza
Summary: Several influential scholars have recently argued that Herodotus’ thought about the gods and historical causation is inconsistent and ‘proverbial’ in nature, and these conclusions have been used to support far-reachingtheories about the nature of ancient Greek religion and archaic thought. Taking the Croesus logos as a case study, I question some of the philosophical premises and methodological practices employed in recent arguments for Herodotus’ inconsistency. I argue that much analysis is based on a reductive treatment of key words or phrases (often classed as ‘proverbs’) in isolation from their immediate context. I also argue that stronger claims about the difference between ancient religious/proverbial thought and modern, secular thought rely on circular reasoning. Finally I explore alternative approaches to the interpretation of the theology of Herodotus’ Croesus logos, discussing examples from humanist apologetics to literary analysis in the twenty-firstcentury. In exploring various approaches to Herodotean exegesis I offer a new analysis of several key concepts (divine nemesis, divine phthonos, sumphorē) and reassess the dynamics of the dialogue between Solon and Croesus.
© 2001-2024 Fundación Dialnet · Todos los derechos reservados