Writing on the page of consciousness

• Autores: Christoph Hoerl
• Localización: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN-e 1467-9264, Vol. 115, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 187-209
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • I identify one particular strand of thought in Thomas Nagel's ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ (1974), which I think has helped shape a certain conception of perceptual consciousness that is still prevalent in the literature. On this conception, perceptual consciousness is to be explained in terms of a special class of properties perceptual experiences themselves exhibit. I also argue that this conception is in fact in conflict with one of the key ideas that supposedly animates Nagel's argument in ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?', which is the idea of an intimate connection between the idea of consciousness and that of a point of view.