Buyer power from joint listing decision

• Autores: Stéphane Caprice, Patrick Rey
• Localización: Economic journal, ISSN 0013-0133, Vol. 125, Nº 589, 2015, págs. 1677-1704
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • We consider a model of vertically related markets, in which an upstream firm faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates with customers that compete in a downstream market. We allow downstream firms to form a buyer group which selects suppliers on behalf of its members. We show that transforming individual listing decisions into a joint listing decision makes delisting less harmful for a group member, which in turn enhances the group members' bargaining position at the expense of the upstream firm. We also discuss the implication for upstream investment incentives.