Bald-faced lies: : how to make a move in a language game without making a move in a conversation

• Autores: Jessica Keiser
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 2, 2016, págs. 461-472
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • According to the naïve, pre-theoretic conception, lying seems to be characterized by the intent to deceive. However, certain kinds of bald-faced lies appear to be counterexamples to this view, and many philosophers have abandoned it as a result. I argue that this criticism of the naïve view is misplaced; bald-faced lies are not genuine instances of lying because they are not genuine instances of assertion. I present an additional consideration in favor of the naïve view, which is that abandoning it comes at an extremely high price; alternative accounts which eschew the intent-to-deceive condition on lying have difficulty distinguishing lies from non-literal speech.