Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions

• Autores: Abel M. Winn, Michael L. Parente, David Porter
• Localización: Southern Economic Journal, ISSN 0038-4038, ISSN-e 2325-8012, Vol. 82, Nº. 3, 2016, págs. 760-780
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers’ behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral.