Hawthorne’s might-y failure: : a reply to “Knowledge and epistemic necessity”

• Autores: Nick Colgrove, Trent Dougherty
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 5, 2016, págs. 1165-1177
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In “Knowledge and epistemic necessity,” John Hawthorne gives a defense of what he rightly calls the “standard approach” to epistemic possibility against what he calls a new “competing idea” presented by Dougherty and Rysiew which he notes has been “endorsed and elaborated upon” by Fantl and McGrath. According to the standard approach, roughly, p is epistemically possible for S if S doesn’t know that not-p. The new approach has it that p is epistemically possible if p has a non-zero (or perhaps non-negligible) epistemic probability. Both approaches, he notes, would explain the (at least sometime) oddness of CKAs, utterances of the form “p, but possibly not p.” However, he offers a number of arguments designed to show that the standard approach has other advantages. In this paper, we undermine Hawthorne’s reasons for favoring the standard approach over Dougherty and Rysiew’s alternative approach.