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Metaphysical rationalism

  • Autores: Shamik Dasgupta
  • Localización: Noûs, ISSN-e 1468-0068, Vol. 50, Nº. 2, 2016, págs. 379-418
  • Idioma: inglés
  • Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
  • Resumen
    • The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a “grounding” explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a “rationalist” metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are “metaphysically brute” and that the world could in so many ways have been different.


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