Resumen de A Theory of Choice Under Internal Conflict
Ricardo Arlegi Pérez, Miriam Teschl
In this paper we argue, inspired by some psychological literature, that choices are the outcome of the interplay of di erent, potentially conicting motivations. We propose an axiomatic approach with two motivations, which we assume to be single-peaked over a certain given dimension. We rst consider the case in which motivations are given and stable, and then introduce some motivation change. We show rst that under the no motivations change case, certain choice behaviour that appears to be inconsistent from the standard rational choice point of view may be explained in our framework as the outcome of conicting motivations. Afterwards, under the motivations change case, we present two psychologically-avoured assumptions about how motivations are inuenced by choices and also a weak condition of rationality. We show that, under such three conditions motivation change leads to less inconsistent choices and not to more inconsistencies as one may think. This means that it is only by choosing di erent actions that conicts between two motivations can eventually be resolved and the de nite and nal preference for an action can be revealed.
