Kant on perceptual content

• Autores: Colin McLear
• Localización: Mind, ISSN-e 1460-2113, Vol. 125, Nº. 497, 2016, págs. 95-144
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial in itself and in attribution to Kant, it promises to make sense of central claims within his critical philosophy.