What is the well-foundedness of grounding?

• Autores: C. Scott Dixon
• Localización: Mind, ISSN-e 1460-2113, Vol. 124, Nº. 498, 2016, págs. 439-468
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • A number of philosophers think that grounding is, in some sense, well-founded. This thesis, however, is not always articulated precisely, nor is there a consensus in the literature as to how it should be characterized. In what follows, I consider several principles that one might have in mind when asserting that grounding is well-founded, and I argue that one of these principles, which I call ‘full foundations’, best captures the relevant claim. My argument is by the process of elimination. For each of the inadequate principles, I illustrate its inadequacy by showing either that it excludes cases that should not be ruled out by a well-foundedness axiom for grounding, or that it admits cases that should be ruled out.