Presidential coattails and electoral coordination in multilevel elections: Comparative lessons from Brazil

• André Borges ^[1] ; Ryan Lloyd ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidade de Brasília

     Universidade de Brasília

     Brasil

     
  2. [2] University of Texas-Austin
• Localización: Electoral Studies: An international Journal, ISSN 0261-3794, Nº 43, 2016, págs. 104-114
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This article seeks to understand how concurrent presidential and gubernatorial elections in strong federal systems affect electoral coordination and coattails voting between national and subnational levels of government. We seek to determine whether the nationalizing effect of presidential elections can overcome the strong incentives for regionalization that can arise in federal systems. We use individual-level survey data and time-series cross-sectional electoral data from Brazil, a federal country with decentralized electoral institutions that has recently adopted concurrent presidential and gubernatorial elections. We find that the congruence between national and subnational elections increases when elections are temporally proximate and the effective number of presidential candidates is low. In short, the coattails effect can not only operate “horizontally,” by shaping national legislative elections, but also “vertically,” by shaping subnational elections.