Bypassing Congressional Committees:: Parties, Panel Rosters, and Deliberative Processes

• Autores: William Bendix
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 41, N. 3, 2016, págs. 687-714
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Although scholars have examined committee rosters extensively, no study has considered the relationship between the ideological composition of panels and their participation in bill drafting. I thus ask: Which committees are frequently excluded from legislative deliberations? Does the composition of committees affect the degree to which they contribute to bill development? Using DW-NOMINATE data, I calculate ideological scores for congressional panels between 1989 and 2010 to see whether certain committees are routinely bypassed. I find that moderate panels, polarized panels, and panels with moderate chairs are often excluded, while extreme committees in the majority direction tend to retain bill-writing duties.