Do Financial Analysts Perform a Monitoring Role in China? Evidence from Modified Audit Opinions

Jiandong Chen ^[3] ; Rong Ding ^[1] ; Wenxuan Hou ^[2] ; Sofia Johan ^[4]
1. [1] University of Warwick
  
  University of Warwick
  
  Reino Unido
2. [2] University of Edinburgh
  
  University of Edinburgh
  
  Reino Unido
3. [3] University of Finance and Economics, China
4. [4] University, Toronto, Canada
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Localización: Abacus: A journal of accounting, finance and business studies, ISSN 0001-3072, Vol. 52, Nº 3, 2016, págs. 473-500
Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
- This paper examines the impact of analyst coverage on the financial reporting quality of firms as reflected by modified audit opinions (MAOs). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2009, we find that analyst coverage, which serves as an external governance mechanism, helps to enhance the financial reporting quality of Chinese listed firms. The effect is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (i.e., private firms), in that they are more dependent on external equity capital and, therefore, under greater pressure from analysts to provide high-quality accounting information. Furthermore, analysts play a more effective role for firms with stronger incentives to manipulate financial reports. Our findings are robust to the control of endogeneity issue.