Contextualism about object-seeing

• Autores: Ben Phillips
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 9, 2016, págs. 2377-2396
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I argue that the notions of object-seeing that earn their explanatory keep in both vision science and the philosophy of perception are context-sensitive as well.