Effects of corruption on performance: Evidence from the UN-REDD Programme

• Autores: Jichuan Sheng, Xiao Han, Hui Zhou, Zhuang Miao
• Localización: Land use policy: The International Journal Covering All Aspects of Land Use, ISSN 0264-8377, ISSN-e 1873-5754, Nº. 59, 2016, págs. 344-350
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Corruption is one of the major challenges to the effectiveness of REDD programs and should be addressed. In this paper we use a dynamic game model to analyze the effects of corruption on the performance of REDD programs, and on the benefits to stakeholders. Using panel data from 2010 to 2013 of 11 partner countries of the UN-REDD Programme countries, relationships between corruption and performance in REDD programs are empirical analyzed. Empirical results confirm that an increase in the degree of corruption may lessen emissions reduction, leading to a decrease in an investment in the REDD program. Following from this analysis, this paper proposes to: (i) establish a credible, transparent, and efficient governance structure, (ii) develop a fair and transparent benefit-sharing mechanism, as well as (iii) use a market mechanism in REDD programs to avoid corruption.