Ayuda
Ir al contenido

Dialnet


Do information releases increase or decrease information asymmetry? New evidence from analyst forecast announcements

  • Autores: Dan Amiram, Edward L. Owens, Oded Rozenbaum
  • Localización: Journal of accounting and economics, ISSN 0165-4101, Vol. 62, Nº. 1, 2016, págs. 121-138
  • Idioma: inglés
  • Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
  • Resumen
    • Abstract Prior literature documents that both earnings announcements and management earnings forecasts increase information asymmetry at announcement. In contrast, we predict and document that analyst earnings forecasts decrease information asymmetry at announcement. As expected, this directional contrast is temporary, in that all three information release types lead to a decrease in information asymmetry following the short-window announcement period. Our evidence demonstrates that the direction of the effect of a public information release on announcement-period information asymmetry is determined by how the information contained in the release relates to prior information held by sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, which supports extant disclosure theory.


Fundación Dialnet

Dialnet Plus

  • Más información sobre Dialnet Plus

Opciones de compartir

Opciones de entorno