Retrospective Congressional Oversight and the Dynamics of Legislative Influence over the Bureaucracy

• Autores: Jason A. MacDonald, Robert J. McGrath
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 41, N. 4, 2016, págs. 899-934
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Research stresses that congressional committees increase their oversight of the bureaucracy during divided government. We extend this research by developing an explanation, rooted in a more dynamic view of policymaking, for why Congress would sometimes conduct vigorous oversight under unified control as well. In short, committees seem to engage in what we call “retrospective oversight” and take advantage of newly friendly executive administration to refocus existing policy made under a past opposition president. We assess our perspective using two separate sources of data on oversight hearings spanning more than 60 years and find support for our claims regarding retrospective oversight.