Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
- Autores: Giovanni Rolla
- Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 39, Nº. 3, 2016, págs. 5-28
- Idioma: inglés
- Enlaces
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Resumen
ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario.
