The pragmatics of scepticism

• Pierluigi Chiassoni ^[1]
  1. [1] Università di Genova
• Localización: Analisi e diritto = Análisis y derecho = Law and analysis = Droit et analyse = Análise e direito, ISSN 1126-5779, Nº. 2016, 2016, págs. 275-303
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • My aim in this paper is arguing for interpretive scepticism from a pragmatics point of view. The argument will proceed in four steps. In the first step, I will lay down the conceptual framework. In the second step, I will make clear what I consider interpretive scepticism and formalism to be. Here, I will contrast scepticism (non-cognicivism) with two varieties of formalism (integral and restricted cognitivism, respectively), and set forth a few criticisms of them. In the third step, I will consider a sophisticated version of restricted cognitivism: the one defended by Andrei Mannor in a series of valuable essays. Mannor makes his case by resorting to philosophy of language. I will argue, however, that philosophy of language, and pragmatics as a substantive part thereof, far from providing support for the restricted form of cognitivism Mannor advocates, suggest, contrariwise, that it should be abandoned. In the fourth , and last, step, I will lay down the outline of a pragmatic interpretivist theory of judicial interpretation.