When Are Local Incumbents Held Accountable for Government Performance?: Evidence from US School Districts

• Autores: Julia A. Payson
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 42, N. 3, 2017, págs. 421-448
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Do voters hold local officials accountable for government performance? Using over a decade of panel data on school district elections and academic achievement in California, I causally identify the effect of test score changes on school board incumbent re-election rates and show that incumbents are more likely to win re-election when test scores improve in their districts—but only in presidential election years. This effect disappears in midterm and off-years, indicating that election timing might facilitate local government accountability.