Relational Contracts in Competitive Labour Markets

• Autores: Simon Board, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
• Localización: Review of economic studies, ISSN 0034-6527, Vol. 82, Nº 2, 2015, págs. 490-534
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We analyze a large, anonymous labour market in which firms motivate their workers via relational contracts. The market is frictionless and features on-the-job search, in that all acceptable vacancies are immediately filled and the employed compete with the unemployed for vacancies. While firms and workers are ex ante identical, the unique equilibrium exhibits a continuous distribution of contracts in which high wage firms have higher retention rates, more motivated workers and higher productivity. The model thus generates dispersion in wages, productivity and human resource strategies, and gives rise to endogenous job ladders. An exogenous increase in on-the-job search increases the quantity of jobs but decreases their quality; with sufficient on-the-job search there is full employment, and wage dispersion rather than unemployment motivates workers.