The progressive recognition of aboriginal rights in the Canadian legal system is assessed in the following essay. Since the time of colonization until the Nineteen-eighties, First Nations have suffered from discrimination and segregation. Their legal condition was overturned with the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognized the special rights of First Nations. The Act clearly stated that both the federal and the provincial legislations were to recognize aboriginal rights, in relation to which it used two different linguistic expressions: existing rights and treaty rights. The first category consists of those rights awarded to the Aborigines long before the European colonization occurred: they were still valid and in force when the Constitution Act was adopted and Aboriginal communities would probably still possess them, if only they had not been expressly extinguished in consequence of a treaty or of a parliamentary act. The second category includes those rights declared and acknowledged in the treaties drawn up between provincial authorities, on one side, and indigenous communities, on the other one.
As a consequence, the practical use of the principle recognizing the uniqueness of indigenous peoples has produced several conflicts within the Canadian courts.
The essay aims at showing the evolution of the jurisprudence and its attempt to reconcile universal rights with the rights of autochthonous communities. In fact, it is truly possible to assert that tradition-based rules concerning First Nations can be in conflict with those protecting fundamental rights.
L’articolo intende illustrare il progressivo riconoscimento dei diritti delle popolazioni autoctone nell’ordinamento giuridico canadese. Dai tempi della colonizzazione fino agli anni ottanta del secolo scorso, le First Nations sono state vittime di discriminazione e segregazione. La loro condizione giuridica cambia con l’approvazione del Constitution Act, 1982 che riconosce diritti speciali a livello costituzionale. Le norme, infatti, impongono ai poteri pubblici il rispetto sia di existing rights che di treaty rights. I primi si configurerebbero come diritti di cui gli aborigeni sarebbero titolari prima dell’insediamento europeo e ancora riconosciuti alla data dell’entrata in vigore del Constitution Act, 1982, mentre rientrerebbero nella seconda categoria i diritti che sono espressi e riconosciuti nei trattati stipulati fra le autorità provinciali e le popolazioni aborigene.
L’articolo vuole mostrare, attraverso la ricognizione della giurisprudenza della Corte suprema, come il riconoscimento della specificità culturali delle First Nations possa produrre conflitti con la tutela dei diritti universali della persona.
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