The corporate control and capìtal structure choise in a French-civil Law country

• Autores: Eduardo José Menéndez Alonso, Silvia Gómez Ansón
• Localización: Revista española de financiación y contabilidad, ISSN 0210-2412, Nº 115, 2003 (Ejemplar dedicado a: 26th Annual Congress of the EAA (Seville)), págs. 256-289
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This study analyses, using different methodologies, the relation between the firms' organisational structure and their capital structure choice in a civil law country, with closely held and medium size firms. Our findings suggest that entrenched CEOs tend to avoid the use of debt. Leverage levels are lower for firms with larger boards, small levels of managerial ownership and for firms lacking the presence of family groups. Our results also suggest that banks' presence, as shareholders, does not lead to higher debt levels. Exogenous shocks such as CEO's changes or takeovers do not appear to affect firms' total leverage.