How procedures shape substance: institutional design and antitrust evidentiary standards

• Autores: Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Jean-Philippe Tropeano
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 46, Nº 1, 2018, págs. 143-164
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper studies the relative impact of public and private competition law enforcement on the optimal evidence threshold for antitrust liability with asymmetric information on the true type of the defendant. We also determine how to set monetary transfers (award to plaintiff and payment by defendant) in complement to the optimal standard of evidence. We obtain that stronger public enforcement always leads to a lower optimal standard of evidence. This may only enhance welfare if the information available is good enough.