Codecision procedure biais: the European legislation game

• Autores: Jenny Helstroffer, Marie Obidzinski
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 38, Nº 1, 2014, págs. 29-46
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The European Union’s codecision procedure is analyzed as a bargaining game between the Council and the European Parliament. The model shows that the policy outcome is biased towards the ideal point of the institution that is closest to the status quo, when the negotiation leads to an agreement. If the Council’s ideal policy is closer to the status quo, as is the case for example concerning the duration of maternity leave, the resulting policy will remain closer to the Council’s than to the European Parliament’s position. Furthermore, the result of the codecision procedure is Kaldor–Hicks inefficient. The developments of common policies concerning asylum, fishery and maternity leave illustrate both the possibility of the failure of negotiations and the influence of the Council on the outcome.