Public Choice at the Intersection of Environmental Law and Economics

• Autores: Bruce Yandle
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 8, Nº 1, 1999, págs. 5-27
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Management of environmental assets begins with a commons and ends with various legal institutions that assign property rights and control. Each step in the evolution of these legal institutions involves collective decision making. Public Choice analysis helps to explain the decision making process and institutional characteristics that emerge. A survey of Public Choice literature that addresses environmental issues illustrates how Public Choice sheds light on outcomes for the U.S. experience. In the absence of Public Choice theory, law and economics scholars would be hard pressed to explain why costly forms of environmental regulation seem preferred to apparently more efficient institutions and why the body politic seemingly accepts a high-cost, low-output outcome.