Myopic Agency

• Autores: John Y. Zhu
• Localización: Review of economic studies, ISSN 0034-6527, Vol. 85, Nº 2, 2018, págs. 1352-1388
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • I consider a dynamic principal-agent setting in which the agent repeatedly chooses between hidden long-term and short-term actions. Relative to the long-term action, the short-term action boosts output today but hurts output tomorrow. I explicitly characterize the optimal contract that always induces the long-term action. It features a cliff-like arrangement that rewards high output today based on the streak of consecutive high outputs the agent has generated leading up to today: The longer the streak, the larger the reward. The optimal contract can be implemented as a bonus bank. Bonus banks feature prominently in the recent debate on bonus reform. I shed light on the opposing arguments driving this debate by formally comparing the myopic agency optimal contract and optimal contracts that arise from traditional effort-shirking agency models.