Review of emergency structures in competitive games
- Autores: Madjid Eshaghi Gordji, Zahra Farhad Touski, Amir Rashme
- Localización: QUID: Investigación, Ciencia y Tecnología, ISSN-e 2462-9006, ISSN 1692-343X, Nº. Extra 2, 2018 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Special Issue), págs. 41-48
- Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
One of the biggest problems of human society is facing crises. Origins of many crises go back to strategy selection in the relations between human beings. In this article, the crises have been discussed, whose origin is relations between human beings. By defining critical points in 2 × 2 games, we provide a mathematical model to detect this type of crises, and then by defining a unique compromise point, we offer solutions for this type of crisis. In many crises such as The Cuban Missile Crisis, Nash equilibrium will not work and leads to the creation of a vacuum in the use of game theory. We believe that what is presented in this article can help fill the void. Fixing the vacuum in game theory and optimal use of compromise and critical points leads to the development of cooperation - cooperation strategy in the world.
