Strategic Interaction Among Overlapping Local Jurisdictions

• Autores: Spencer T. Brien
• Localización: The American review of public administration, ISSN 0275-0740, Vol. 48, Nº. 6, 2018, págs. 584-595
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This article explores the strategic interactions between overlapping counties and school districts within the context of property tax policy. Overlapping local governments share either part or all of their property tax bases and therefore may take into account each other’s tax policies when deciding their annual property tax rate. A dynamic model is developed to analyze how property tax rate determination is influenced by the fiscal policies of both overlapping and neighboring local jurisdictions. The results suggest a short-term mimicking effect that is largely canceled out the following period. These findings help to develop a more complete understanding of how the broader set of environmental and institutional attributes of local governments influence their fiscal policies.