Is Griffin a millian utilitarian after all?

• Autores: Esperanza Guisán Seijas
• Localización: Telos: Revista iberoamericana de estudios utilitaristas, ISSN-e 2255-596X, ISSN 1132-0877, Vol. 10, Nº. 1, 2001 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Understanding Griffin), págs. 9-12
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Griffin's ethics are a welcome return to ethics after many years of relativism, of unquestionable principles as in Rawls, and of a broadly popular formalism that did little to improve value judgement. Written from the most interesting viewpoint of substantive ethics, Griffin's work is a complete treatise on Ethics, ranging from metaethics, or justification of values, to normative and practical ethics. Realistic and sensible, he bases morality in prudence, filling in important gaps, such as those between reason and desire, prudence and morality, etc..

    Apparently his book Value Judgement is a refusal of utilitarianism, neokant ianism and virtue ethics. In my opinion, however, it is heavily influenced by Mill, using different words for the same purposes or aims. The idea that being human is better than being happy is a central indicator of how much Mill's idea of a happy life is retained in Griffin's idea of human life or personhood.

    Of course Griffin lacks the force of an ethical reformist, although in his deliberately modest way he calls for moral education and the development of sympathy.

    His rejection of unlimited impartiality is one of the more polemic issues in his work and his evaluation of law and institutions like property or family needs clarification.

    In my opinion, Griffin's ethics is rather sound and realistic, even though this approach considers human psychology as an unavoidable datum. Human beings are really much more indeterminate and environmental, social and formal education can change human capacities so much.

    More than a classical utilitarian, Griffin may be considered a reluctant Millian in a world very different from Mill's own.