Organizational Form and Payoff Imbalances in an Aggrievement Model: Cooperatives versus Privately Owned Wineries
- Autores: Francisco J. Santos Arteaga, Günter Schamel
- Localización: Journal of Wine Economics, ISSN-e 1931-437X, Vol. 13, Nº. 3, 2018, págs. 263-281
- Idioma: inglés
- Enlaces
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Resumen
We build on Hart and Holmstrom (2010) to analyze the strategic choice of organizational form among wine producers. They claim that a firm’s organizational form, when agreed upon com- petitively, conditions the sense of entitlement of the involved parties. The sense of entitlement determines their feeling of grievance for the outcome of the contract and, if so, their shading efforts by partially withholding consummate performance, creating deadweight losses. We consider two main organizational forms: non-integration, where growers interact in the wine- making process and can highlight the quality of their individual contributions, and integration, where individual contributions to the process may not be explicitly acknowledged and the winemaker cannot exert quality control over the production chain. We present a formal coor- dination model that illustrates how cooperatives and private firms can coexist within a market. Furthermore, given the reasonable parameter constraints, it illustrates how an integrated cooperative can obtain a higher social surplus than a non-integrated private firm.
