The Effects of State Delinquent Tax Collection Outsourcing on Administrative Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Procedural Fairness

• Sungkyu Jang ^[2] ; Eger III, Robert J. ^[1]
  1. [1] Naval Postgraduate School

     Naval Postgraduate School

     Estados Unidos

     
  2. [2] Indiana University South Bend USA
• Localización: The American review of public administration, ISSN 0275-0740, Vol. 49, Nº. 2, 2019, págs. 236-251
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Since the 1980s, state governments have been using private debt collection agencies as facilitators and expediters in the delinquent tax collection process. The use of private collection agencies incorporates administrative effectiveness, efficiency, and procedural fairness, which can lead to an increase in revenues without affecting either the tax base or rate while protecting taxpayers. Using state-level panel data for the years 2000 to 2011, the administrative effectiveness outcome is that private collectors do not reduce the aggregate delinquent tax inventory, but the administrative efficiency outcome is that private collectors reduce collection cost. For procedural fairness, private collectors have a positive effect on the number of tax appeals filed in a state tax department with a Republican governor; however, they decrease the number of tax appeals filed with an outside-independent tax appeal agency.