Personnel Decisions, Wage Profiles and Investment in Firms

• Autores: John Douglas Skåtun, Ioannis Theodossiou
• Localización: British journal of industrial relations, ISSN 0007-1080, Vol. 49, Nº. 4, 2011, págs. 742-766
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • An investment model where firms mitigate adverse hold‐up effects using hiring and personnel policies is theoretically investigated and empirically scrutinized. While no evidence for the prediction of differing worker characteristics, other than gender, across firms is found, demand (firm) side factors are evident in the hiring process. Evidence on other personnel policies is consistent with theory, which predicts firms with high‐investment expenditures resist unions, utilize more temporary and shift‐time workers and conduct more multitask training. Wages in high‐investment firms are higher, more sensitive to unemployment and experience variables that exhibit greater effects than in low‐investment firms.