The Reasons Account of Free Will A Libertarian-Compatibilist Hybrid

• Autores: Julian Nida-Rümelin
• Localización: Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, ARSP, ISSN 0001-2343, Vol. 105, Nº 1, 2019, págs. 3-10
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Free Will is constituted by a desire to act that is based on practical reasons. Being guided by reasons constitutes (free) human agency. The reasons account, which I will develop in this paper, is libertarian, as it implies that human agency is naturalistically underdetermined. Naturalistic descriptions, referring exclusively to natural causes, are not able to fully describe and explain human agency. On the other hand, there are no scientific arguments for the assumption that the causal impact of reasons interferes with the laws of physics. The physical world can – in principle – be described and explained within the conceptual frame of the natural sciences. The causal impact of reasons does not interfere with the laws of physics. Therefore, my reasons account of Free Will is also compatibilist.