Promises of an impossible compromise: conceded constitutions in Europe, 1814–1906

• Kostas Chrysogonos ^[1]
  1. [1] Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

     Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

     Dimos Thessaloniki, Grecia

     
• Localización: Parliaments, estates & representation = Parlements, états & représentation, ISSN-e 1947-248X, ISSN 0260-6755, Vol. 39, Nº. 1, 2019, págs. 1-10
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The enactment of a constitution through the method of ‘concession’, as it was used in Europe between the Napoleonic wars and World War I, indicates that a hitherto absolute ruler understood the need for a higher level of institutionalization and collective exercise of state power, but mistrusted institutionalized and collective processes, which would define the level needed. In other word, a ‘concession’ comprehended an imminent contradiction. Drafting an enduring constitution is a complex and difficult task, which requires consensus- building on a wide scale through collective procedures. However, a ruler who ‘concedes’ implicitly denies any kind of collective constitution-making, which could get out of the ruler’s control. Instead rulers preferred a non-inclusive approach, using court advisors and/or ministers appointed by the ruler, to draft the constitutional text. The European experience analyzed in this article shows that popular involvement through representative procedures (such as the election of a constituent assembly) in the making of a constitution can improve its chances for endurance through time and create a political environment more favourable for the constitution to achieve normative quality, instead of remaining essentially a false promise.