Il 25 luglio 1943 come problema storiografico
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[1] Università de Roma La Sapienza
Università de Roma La Sapienza
Roma Capitale, Italia
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- Localización: Nuova rivista storica, ISSN 0029-6236, Vol. 102, Nº. 3, 2018, págs. 1111-1117
- Idioma: italiano
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
This paper concerns the question of the national and international causes of the fall of fascism and Mussolini’s role before and during the night of 24-25 July 1943. After the second battle of Alamein (23 October - 11 November 1942), in order to save the regime, Mussolini’s main concern became how to reach a compromise peace agreement with Soviet Russia. As Hitler remained obdurate, however, the sole option left to the «Duce» was to send stern warnings to Berlin about the precariousness of his domestic position. The historians have often interpreted Mussolini’s growing apathy and unusual passivity, facing domestic opposition, as the result of his declining health or of his overconfidence. On the contrary, in his desperate struggle to sway Hitler, Mussolini needed to provide him with a last and unquestionable proof of how awful the situation had become for the regime in Italy and for himself. In Mussolini’s twisted calculations, by deliberately provoking the opposition against him, the vote in the Grand Council would have provided that evidence. It proved to be his last political gamble.
